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jou r nal h o mep ag e: w ww .e lsev ier . co m / loc ate / i j idIn a paper by Saad and co-workers in this issue of the
International Journal of Infections Diseases reporting on seventy
consecutive patients with MERS-CoV in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, KSA, 55% (39/70) were deﬁned as health care associated.
Only one of the seventy had contact with camels within two weeks
of onset of symptoms. The authors write that ‘‘Healthcare exposure
to infection was the most important risk factor to develop MERS-
CoV infection’’.
Also in this issue Memish and co-workers report that MERS-CoV
shedding in inpatients is much longer compared to MERS-CoV
patients managed outside hospitals. This may not be surprising as
the most severe cases are admitted, but again underline high risk of
infection in hospitals from severe MERS-CoV infections. Clearly
health care workers are more exposed compared to household
contacts of milder cases managed at home. The report by Abaidani
and co-workers of two fatal cases in the Sultanate of Oman
admitted to intensive care and treated in ventilators resulted in no
secondary cases.
As of 30 September 2014 there had been a global total of
887 laboratory conﬁrmed cases of MERS-CoV infection reported,
including 352 deaths (CFR 39.7%), with 97.5% (865/887) of cases
occurring in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,
Qatar, Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon and Iran).1 Of
these, 85.0% (754) were reported by Saudi Arabia.2
A cluster of nosocomial MERS-CoV infections was reported in
April – May 2013 from eastern Saudi Arabia, where 21 out of
23 patients were infected in the hospital. An additional ﬁve
clusters arising from these patients were found, of whom two were
in health care workers.3 A report of seven secondary cases in health
care workers found that two were asymptomatic carriers of MERS-
CoV, one had only a runny nose, and four reported mild symptoms.
They did not require treatment, recovered fully within a week, and
remained healthy on follow-up.4 Nosocomial transmission of
MERS-CoV between two immunosuppressed patients was
reported early in the outbreak outside of the Middle East.5 In
September 2013, the CDC has determined that federal isolation and
quarantine were authorized for MERS-CoV.6 A screening study of
5,065 patients and contacts found 99 MERS-CoV infected cases of
which 70 were hospitalized and 19 (19.2%) were health care
workers.7
An update from the 25th of April 2014 by the European Center
for Disease Control, ECDC, concluded that ‘‘Recent MERS-CoV cases
comprise a signiﬁcant proportion of healthcare workers and
asymptomatic cases or cases presenting with mild symptoms’’ andhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2014.10.001
1201-9712/ 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).commented on the April outbreak in hospitals in Jeddah that ‘‘it is
unclear if the recent hospital clusters in SA and UAE resulted from a
failure to adhere to these recommendations, or from the failure of
these measures themselves!’’.8 An analysis of the 2012 outbreak in
Jordan, the ﬁrst known cases of MERS-CoV infection, found an
attack rate of 10% among potentially exposed hospital personnel,9
compared to a study of secondary transmission in the home which
found an attack rate of 5%.10
A review of 95 cases showed that 63.2% were healthcare associated
and 13.7% took place in family contacts.11 In a recent update by the
WHO, it was noted that the number of laboratory-conﬁrmed MERS-
CoV cases increased sharply at the beginning of mid-March 2014, in
KSA and UAE, and was related to the occurrence of healthcare-
associated outbreaks.12 Transmission on commercial aircraft and
other public transportation has not been reported and appears to be
rare or nonexistent among airline passengers who traveled with two
well-publicized infected and symptomatic passengers to the USA
despite the conduct of an extensive investigation.13
The paper by Saad and co-workers in this issue of the
International Journal of Infections Diseases deﬁned health care
associated infection as onset of illness more than 48 hours after
admission or within 14 days after discharge from the hospital. This
clearly does not entirely exclude infection occurring outside the
health care facility since incubation periods of up to two weeks have
been described (although more commonly less than one week).
MERS-CoV appears to have a relatively low R0,
14,10 yet the major
seasonal increases of MERS-CoV activity observed in April 2012,8
April/May/June 2013,1 August/September 201315 and April/May/
June 201416 all included nosocomial outbreaks, urging the need to
further investigate in-hospital risk factors for exposure and
transmission. The paper by Saad and co-workers presented a
cluster of 15 cases related to exposure in the Emergency Room
where 10 cases were apparently infected by a single patient.
A follow-up case-control study involving these cases with
controls being other patients treated in the same emergency room
on the same day might greatly enhance our knowledge on risk
factors for transmission of MERS-CoV in the hospital environment.
Likewise, going forward, case control studies are needed to better
deﬁne risk factors for MERS-CoV transmission both in the
community as well as in the healthcare environment.
Nevertheless, the study highlights that transmission in health
care facilities may be a major driver of the infection in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia. The fact that there were 10 healthcare workers
with MERS-CoV infection in the Prince Sultan Military Medicalciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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in the hospital during the period covered by the study.
The importance of transmission in health care facilities could be
further supported by mapping patient routes within the facility, as
well as where they were waiting and for how long they were in
each location. History of exposure to laboratory conﬁrmed cases of
MERS-CoV infection within the hospital should be ascertained,
with documentation of no prior contact between these individuals
outside of the hospital environment.
It is uncertain as yet whether MERS-CoV has pandemic or even
epidemic potential. So far more than 90% of cases have been
reported from KSA with few cases from neighboring countries. In
the two years since the ﬁrst report of the infection, it has not spread
outside the region except for very limited secondary spread from
an imported case to close family contacts. At a workshop held in
Riyadh in April 2014, the epidemiology of MERS-CoV was
discussed and from the data presented,14 the meeting concluded
that the outbreak was the result of repeated introductions of the
MERS-CoV into the human population resulting from contact with
infected camels and that the actual R0 was below 1, and probably
below 0.5.14,10
If this is true and if the results in this paper hypothesizing that
over 50% of cases treated in one hospital were nosocomially
transmitted, there is a large potential to reduce transmission
through early identiﬁcation of possible MERS-CoV infected
patients thereby leading to early isolation of these patients –
ideally at the arrival point in the hospital.
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